Richard P. Hampton And  Patricia L.  Hampton, His  Wife v. State Of  Utah: Utah State R0Ad Commission; Ernest H. Balch; Elias J. Strong; Francis Feltch; W. J. Smirl; Ames K. Bagley; Utah State Department Of Highways; C. Taylor Burton : Brief of Respondents by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1967
Richard P. Hampton And Patricia L. Hampton, His
Wife v. State Of Utah: Utah State R0Ad
Commission; Ernest H. Balch; Elias J. Strong;
Francis Feltch; W. J. Smirl; Ames K. Bagley; Utah
State Department Of Highways; C. Taylor Burton :
Brief of Respondents
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Phil L. Hansen and Gary A. Frank; Attorneys for Respondents
State Capitol Building Salt Lake City, Utah
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hampton v. Utah, No. 10997 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4369
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE________________ l 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ____________ :___ 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL __ ------------------------------- 2 
SATEMENT OF FACTS -------------------------------------------------- 2 
POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT. 
A. TO PROPERLY CONSIDER THE MERITS 
OF THE INSTANT CASE, IT IS NECESSARY 
TO IDENTIFY AND RECOGNIZE THE TYPE 
OF PROPERTY RIGHT OR INTEREST AL-
LEGEDLY APPROPRIATED BY RESPOND-
ENTS.---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 
B. THE ALLEGED DAMAGES COMPLAINED 
OF BY APPELLANTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO 
JUDICIAL REVIEW. ------------------------------------------------ 4 
C. SEVERAL CONTENTIONS ASSERTED BY 
APPELLANTS ARE TOTALLY WITHOUT 
MERIT AND MAY BE DISPOSED OF SUM-
MARILY. ------------------------------------------------- --------------------- 4 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIS-
MISSING APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT. 
A. TO PROPERLY CONSIDER THE 
MERITS OF THE INSTANT CASE, IT IS 
NECESSARY TO IDENTIFY AND RECOG-
NIZE THE TYPE OF PROPERTY RIGHT OR 
INTEREST ALLEGEDLY APPROPRIATED 
BY RESPONDENTS. -------- ----------------------------------- 4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page No. 
B. THE ALLEGED D AM AGE S COM-
PLAINED OF BY APPELLANTS ARE NOT 
SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. ________________ 6 
C. SEVERAL CONTENTIONS ASSERTED 
BY APPELLANTS ARE TOTALLY WITHOUT 
MERIT AND MAY BE DISPOSED OF SUM-
MARILY. ------------------------------------------------------------------ 13 
CASES CITED 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 
P.2d 157 (1960) ____________________________________________ 9, 11, 12, 15 
Hurst v. Highway Dep't, 16 Utah 2d 153, 397 P. 2d 71 
(1964). --------- -------------- -- ------ ________________________________ _4, 10, 15 
State by State Road Comm'n v. District Court, Fourth 
Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 
(1937). ------------------------- ______________________________ 6, 7, 8, 10, 14 
State v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962). ____ 9, 16 
State by State Road Comm'n v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah 464, 
120 P.2d 276 (1941). ------------------------------------------------ 9 
Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 119 Utah 50, 224 P.2d 1037 
( 1950). ----- ---- ------------ -- --- ----- ---- --- ---- ---- ------ -------------------- -- 15 
Sine v. Helland, 18 Utah 2d 222, 418 P.2d 979 (1966). 10 
Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 
P.2d 157 (1960). _____________________________________________________ 9, 15 
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 Pac. 626 (1913).____ 12 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1967) _____ __________________ 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 1967) ________________________ 13 
Utah Const. art. I, § 22 _ ___________ _ _ _______ 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 15 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act ____________________________ 13, 14 
In rl,he Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RICHARD P. HAMPTON, and PATRICIA 




STATE UTAH: UTAH STATE ROAD 
COMMISSION; ERNEST H. BALCH, 
ELIAS J. STRONG; FRANCIS FELTCH; 
W. J. SMIRL; AMES K. BAGLEY; 
UT AH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 





BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants initiated suit against the State ot 
Utah, the Utah State Road Commission, the Utah 
3tate Department of Highways, the Director of the 
Utah State Department of Highways, and the indi-
vidual members of the Utah State Road Commis-
sion, wherein appellants sought to recover dam-
ages allegedly resulting from certain construction 
a.ctivities adjacent to appellants' property or, in the 
, lternative, to enjoin respondents from such activ-
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ities. The activities giving rise to appellants' action 
consisted of the construction of an access control 
fence and guard rail facility on property not owned 
or claimed by appellants but adjacent thereto. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Subsequent to the filing of appellants' com-
plaint, respondents sought a motion to dismiss on 
the grounds that the lower court lacked jurisdiction 
over respondents on the grounds and for the 
reasons that the respondents were immune from 
suit. After some delay, the lower court entered a 
ruling dismissing appellants' complaint on the 
merits and with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents submit that the dismissal of appel· 
lants' complaint should be affirmed. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents basically agree with the statemen1 
of facts as set forth in appellants' brief. However, 
the following summary of the allegations contained 
in appellants' complaint should be noted. Count 1 · 
of appellants' complaint seeks damages allegedlv 
caused by the negligent, careless and reckless man 
ner in which the construction activities were accom 
plished. Count II of appellants' complaint alleges an 
easement of ingress and egress acquired by appel 
lants through the use of the public street abuttinc 
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the front of appellant's property. Count II further 
alleges that the construction of the access contrcl 
fence and guard rail facility reduced or destroyed 
the effectiveness of this easement. Count III of ap-
pellants' complaint alleges a nuisance theory and 
Count IV alleges fee tittle to appellants to the 
middle of the public highway abutting the front of 
appellants' property. Count V of appellants' com-
plaint seeks an injunction against respondents to 
enjoin respondents from further interfering with 
appellants' alleged right of access and easement, 
an order requiring respondents to remove the ac-
cess control fence and guard rail facility construct-
ed adjacent to appellants' property, or, in the altern-
ative, an order requiring respondents to institute 
condemnation proceedings to assess the damages 
and compensation due appellants by virtue of the 
construction activities. 
It must be noted that at the time service of 
process was executed on respondents, October 28, 
1964, the alleged interferences with appellants' 
property rights, i.e., the access control fence and 
the guard rail facility, were an accomplished fact. 
POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMIS-
SING APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT. 
A. TO PROPERLY CONSIDER THE MERITS 
OF THE INSTANT CASE, IT IS NECESSARY 
TO IDENTIFY AND RECOGNIZE THE TYPE 
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OF PROPERTY RIGHT OR INTEREST AL-
LEGEDLY APPROPRIATED BY RESPOND-
ENTS. 
B. THE ALLEGED DAMAGES COMPLAINED 
OF BY APPELLANTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO 
JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
C. SEVERAL CONTENTIONS ASSERTED BY 
APPELLANTS ARE TOTALLY WITHOUT 




THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMIS· 
SING APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT. 
A. TO PROPERLY CONSIDER THE MERITS 
OF THE INSTANT CASE, IT IS NECESSARY 
TO IDENTIFY AND RECOGNIZE THE TYPE 
OF PROPERTY RIGHT OR INTEREST AL-
LEGEDLY APPROPRIATED BY RESPOND-
ENTS. 
Respondents agree with appellants that, for the 
purposes of an appeal arising from the granting of 
a motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the 
facts as set forth in appellants' complaint. Hurst v. , 
Highway Dep't, 16 Utah 2nd 153, 397 P.2d 71 (1964). 
Initially, however, respondents submit that as a 
matter of law, respondents are immune from suit 
in each and every allegation contained in appel-
lants' complaint and that appellants totally fail to 
state a cause of action on which relief may be 
granted. 
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To adequately consider the merits of the in-
stant case, it is necessary that appellants' pleadings 
be examined to determine the type of property right 
or interest allegedly appropriated by respondents. 
In this regard, it is of the utmost importance to rec-
ognize that appellants do not allege the taking of 
any real property contained within the legal de-
scription of appellants' property deed. Therefore, 
the only possible property rights or interest that 
have allegedly been appropriated by respondents 
are, ( 1) the alleged impairment of ingress and egress 
to appellants' property and (2) the allegation that 
appellants owned the public street abutting the 
front of their property to the center line and that re-
spondents have appropriated a portion of that street 
so owned by appellants. 
As to the allegation that appellants own the 
public street abutting the front of their property to 
the center line, respondent submits that such alle-
gation is tota.lly without merit. This allegation is 
evidently based on the incorrect assumption that 
there has been an abandonment of the public street 
abutting the front of appellants' property. The 
lower court did not err in refusing to consider this 
allegation because there has been no abandonment 
as a matter of law. 
Therefore. based on the pleadings, the type of 
property right or interest allegedly appropriated by 
respondents is the alleged damage to or desruction 
of appellants' claimed easement of ingress and 
egress. 
B. THE ALLEGED DAMAGES COMPLAINED 
OF BY APPELLANTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO 
JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
It must first be noted that for the purposes of 
this appeal, respondents are willing to concede that 
whatever damages appellants could prove by vir-
tue of the alleged interference with the easement 
of access could be considered compensable under 
the damage provision of Utah Const. Art. I § 22. 
However, this concession does not alleviate the 
problem for the instant case raises the issue as to 
the proper procedure to be pursued by appellants 
in satisfying their claim. Respondents submit that 
if compensation is due appellants, it must come 
from the Utah State Board of Examiners and the 
Utah State Legislature, and not through the courts. 
A distinction has developed between private 
property taken for public use and private property 
damaged by and through public use. This basic 
distinction has further developed into a segrega-
tion of the remedial procedures available to an ag-
grieved party. 
This developed distinction, which has evolved 
into the established law in this jurisdiction, had as 
its inception the eloquent dissent of Chief Justice 
Wolfe in State by State Road Comm'n v. District 
Court. Fourth Judicial District. 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 
502 (1937). In that case the court considered the 
construction by the Utah State Road Commission 
of a viaduct structure that deprived the abutting 
landowners of convenient access, light, air, and 
view (94 Utah 388). The court concluded that al-
though the Utah State Road Commission, as an 
agency of the State of Utah, was immune from suit, 
the individual road commissioners could be en-
joined from the alleged infliction of consequential 
damages on the basis that Utah Const. art I § 22, 
was self-executing (94 Utah 397). In his dissent, Chief 
Justice Wolfe took the authoritative position that 
Utah Const. art. I, § 22, was substantive and not pro-
cedural. As justification for this position the Chief 
Justice reasoned that while compensation is gUar-
anteed by that constitutional provision the pro-
cedure to be employed in satisfying the compensa-
tion requirement is not set forth. That constitutional 
provision does not guarantee that compensation 
shall be first paid before damage occurs. It guar-
antees only that upon damage, compensation will 
be paid. 
In discussing the evolution of the definition of 
the terms "taken or damaged" as found in Utah 
Const. art. I, § 22, Chief Justice Wolfe recognized 
that prior to 1870, only the word "taking" was in-
cluded within the constitutional provisions. This 
necessitated an expansion of the definition of the 
word "taken" to include instances of not only a 
physical take, but also cases where the use or en-
joyment of the property was so impaired as to be 
tantamount to a take. However, because of the sub-
sequent inclusion of the word "damaged" in state 
constitutions, it became necessary to maintain the 
expanded definition of the word "taken." 
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As stated by Chief Justice Wolfe at 94 Utah 408: 
The remedy to prevent a 'taking' without agreed 
compensation or condemnation would be inunction 
because such taking would be without authority. 
The remedy for damages caused by an agency of 
the State performing its functions would be en-
forced as it is enforced in all other cases against 
the State where remedy is not specifically given by 
statute, to wit, by resort to the board of examiners. 
In summarizing his position, Chief Justice Wolfe 
stated at 94 Utah 434, 435: 
Sec. 22, Art. I, of our Constitution, guarantees per-
sons whose property is taken or damaged for public 
use just compensation, but there is no guarantee 
that compensation be first paid before the damage. 
* * * 
Whether the Road Commissioners were suable de-
pends upon whether they were in fact acting law-
fully for a state agency authorized to do the work 
the Road Commissioners were doing. 
The Road Commissioners were not acting outside 
of their authority when they, by constructing the 
viaduct on the state highway, caused consequential 
injuries to abutting owners as described in the com-
plaint for an injunction. 
The Road Commission is subject to the due process 
clauses of both Federal and our State Constitu-
tions, but if the use is a public one the fact that 
proprietors whose property is "damaged" conse-
quential to an improvement of the highway by the 
Road Commission, as distinguished from a "taking," 
are compelled to go to the Board of Examiners for 
inquiry and ascertainment of the damage instead of 
a court, does not withdraw from such proprietors 
the orotection of fh1e nrof'eRf; 
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This distinction between the "taking" and 
"damaging" of property reecived recognition in 
State by State Road Comm'n v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah 
464, 120 P.2d 276 (1941), wherein this court stated 
at 101 Utah 467: 
To the extent that the present taking or construc-
tion so violates condemnee's rights, he is entitled 
to recover; but be the loss what it may it must 
have a causal connection with the taking of the 
property or the construction thereon. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Several recent cases also serve to illustrate this 
distinction. In Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 
Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960), this court consid-
ered an action by abutting property owners for 
damages accruing when the Utah State Road Com-
mission constructed a highway project on a re-
duced grade of sixteen feet below the abutting 
property. This court held that sovereign immunity 
constituted a bar to the action. 
In Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 
2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960), this court held that man-
damus would not be available to compel the indi-
vidual members of the Utah State Road Commis-
sion to initiate condemnation proceedings for 
damages allegedly caused by the impairment of the 
ingress to and egress from private property. 
In State v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 
0 962), the fundamental question was whether the 
State was suable for consequential damages to 
prooerty not souqht for condemnation. This court 
concluded that the State was not suable under the 
circumstances and also recognized the necessity of 
a causal connection between an impairment of in-
gress and egress and the actual physical taking of 
property. 
Also, in Hurst v. Highway Dep't, 16 Utah 2d 153. 
397 P.2d 71 (1964), this court held that sovereign 
immunity was a bar to an action for damages and 
injunctive relief against the operation of a gravel pit 
belonging to the State and allegedly constituting a 
nuisance. See also Sine v. Helland, 18 Utah 2d 222, 
418 P.2d 979 (1966). 
The common denominator in these cases is the 
fact that there was not an actual physical appropria-
tion of private property. Rather, the damages re-
sulted from operations and activities adjacent to the 
private property. In every instance, this court con-
cluded that judicial recourse was not available to 
the aggrieved party. These findings illustrate and 
solidify the position taken by Chief Justice Wolfe 
in State by State Road Comm'n v. District County, 
Fourth Judicial District, supra, that Utah Const. art. I, 
§ 22, is substantive and not procedural. If Utah 
Const. art.I, § 22, was procedural, judicial recourse 
would be aavilable to the aggrieved party. How-
ever, this is clearly not the case. 
The next consideration is whether Utah Const. 
art. I, § 22, is self-executing. This consideration is 
basically intertwined with the consideration as to 
whether the constitutional provision is substantive 
or procedural in that, if it is found to be self-execut-
' I' 
mg, 1t must necessarily be a_ foundation on which to 
justify judicial review. 
This consideration was adequately answered m 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County. supra. wherein this 
court stated at 354 P.2d 106: 
. . . consistently and historically we have ruled that 
the State may not be sued without its consent; 
taken the view that Art. I, Sec. 22 of our Constitu-
tion is not self-executing, nor does it give consent 
to be sued, implied or otherwise; and that to secure 
such consent is a legislative matter, a principle 
recognized by the legislature itself. 
The above-cited cases have established that the 
term "taken" as found in Utah Const. art. I § 22, is 
applicable only where there has been a direct phys-
ical appropriation of private property. Where there 
is a direct physical appropriation of private prop-
erty without just compensation, judicial review may 
arguably be available to the aggrieved party be-
cause the state agency, in so acting, did so without 
authority. However, where private property is con-
sequentially damaged by virtue of the construction_ 
of a public improvement, judicial review is not 
available to the aggrieved party. Under such cir-
cumstances, the proper course of procedure is to 
present the matter to the Utah State Board of Exam-
inters and the Utah State Legislature. 
A full recitation of authorities is not necessary 
for the proposition that the Utah State Road Com-
mission, as an agency of the State of Utah, is im-
mune from suit until consent is given. It is also well 
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established that Utah Const. art. I, § 22, does not 
operate as either an express or implied waiver of 
immunity. Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra. 
To this principle is added the proposition that a 
suit against a public officer is in reality a suit against 
the State unless the public officer acted beyond the 
scope of his authority. Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 
483, 134 Pac. 626 (1913). There being no conceiv-
able basis on which to say the construction of the 
access control fence and guard rail facility were 
not accomplished pursuant to the authority vested 
in respondents, the instant case is obviously a suit 
directed against agencies and public officers vested 
with sovereign immunity. 
In summary, respondents submit that the in-
stant case does not present a situation whereby pri 
vate property has been taken, physically appro-
priated, for a public improvement without just com-
pensation. If such was the case, a suit may arguably 
be maintained because respondents acted beyond 
the scope of their authority. However, in the in-
stant case, the situation is one of an alleged dam-
age to an access easement. The firmly imbedded 
doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes judicial , 
intervention in matters involving consequential 
damages of this nature. Utah Const. art. I, § 22, is 
substantive and not procedural, and also not self-
executing and does not serve as a foundation on 
which to predicate judicial review. Absent a 
physical appropriation, the only recourse available 
to appellants is a presentation of their claim to the 
Utah State Board of Examiners and the Utah State 
i3 
Legislature. This court has no alternative but to af-
firm the lower court's dismissal of appellants' com-
plaint. 
C. SEVERAL CONTENTIONS ASSERTED BY 
APPELLANTS ARE TOTALLY WITHOUT 
MERIT AND MAY BE DISPOSED OF SUM-
MARILY. 
In the course of their brief, appellants make cer-
tain assertions which respondents submit are totally 
without merit. In an effort not to overburden this 
court with undue rhetoric, respondents will attempt 
to summarily dispose of these issues. 
Appellants allege that the instant case comes 
within the purview of the Utah Governmental Im-
munity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -34 (Supp. 
1967). However, appellants fail to recognize that the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act applies only to 
claims and actions arising after July 1, 1966. The 
construction activities complained of by appellants, 
i.e., the construction of the access control fence and 
guard rail facility, were accomplished facts in Oc-
tober of 1964 when service of process was executed 
on the respondent. Therefore, appellants' claim 
arose before July 1, 1966. 
Also, it must be noted that appellants' reliance 
on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is defeat-
ed by the provisions of the act itself. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 1967), requires that a claim 
against the State must be preceded by notice there-
of Hled with the Attorney General of the State of 
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Utah and that such claim is forever barred unless 
the notice is filed within one year after the cause 
of action arises. Appellants' allege to have given 
notice to the State of Utah in 1964, but fail to appre-
ciated that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
was nonexistent in 1964. Thus, even if the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act applied to the facts of 
the instant case, which respondents' vigorously 
deny, it must be conceded that the appellants have 
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies in 
filing a proper notice with the Utah State Attorney 
General's office for consideration of their claim. ' 
The notice given in 1964 is insuffilcient to comply 
with the provisions of the Utah Governmental Im-
munity Act which was not effective until July 1. 
1966. 
It may also be noted that the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act provides a blanket immunity 
to all governmental entities except as that im-
munity is withdrawn by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3) (Supp. 
1967). The type of action pursued by appellant Jn 
. the instant case, not specifically exempted from the 
blanket of immunity, is barred. 
One additional problem must be considered 
in that appellants seek to enjoin the individual 
members of the Utah State Road Commission. Ap-
pellants' reliance on State by State Road Comm'n 
v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, supra, is ob-
vious. The justification given by this court in the 
issuance of the injunction in that case was on the 
15 
theory that Utah Const. art. I,§ 22, was self-executing 
(94 Utah 397). As noted above, Mr. Chief Justice 
Wolfe logically annihilated the justification given 
by the majority based principally on the fact that 
Utah Const. art. I, § 22, is substantive and not pro-
cedural. Also, it is well established that Utah Const. 
art. I, § 22, is not self-executing. 
Any reliance which appellants may give to 
Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 119 Utah 50, 224 P.2d 
1037 (1950), as support for the issuance of an injunc-
tion is misplaced. In Hurst v. Hiqhway Dep't, supra, 
an application for an injunction on a theory of nuis-
ance was denied. This court stated at 397 P.2d 74: 
We have concluded as indicated in this decision 
regardless of what may have been said in the case 
of Shaw v. Salt Lake County . ... 
Also, the propriety of an injunction issued 
against the individual members of the Utah State 
Road Commission is no longer at issue in the instant 
case because the complained of acts, i.e., the con-
struction of an access control fence and guard rail, 
are already an accomplished fact. This is admitted 
in appellants' complaint and brief. 
The inconsistency between those decisions 
which do not allow personal liability for damages, 
Hiorst v. Whittenburg, supra; mandamus to com-
pel eminent domain proceedings, Sprinqville Bank-
inq Co. v. Burton, supra, Fairclouqh v. Salt Lake 
County, supra; the dismissal of a counterclaim on 
the grounds that a counterclaimant could not be in 
a better position than a plaintiff, State v. Parker, 
supra. and allowing that which appellant seeks in 
the instant case is obvious and intolerable. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the absence of a direct physical ap-
propriation of appellants' property and the applica-
bility of the rule that sovereign immunity precludes 
judicial review of consequential damages such as 
alleged in the instant case, respondents submit that 
the dismissal of appe1lants' complaint should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GARY A. FRANK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
